Security is the red-headed stepchild of the web-service world. Sure, there's WS-Security, which may be useful if you're using SOAP in server-server communication. But most services, in particular, browser-accessed services, rely on the security mechanisms provided by HTTP and HTTPS. If you want authentication, you use a 401 response and expect the requester to provide credentials in subsequent requests. If you're paranoid, you use a client certificate.
The wishlist service doesn't quite fit into this model. There's a clear need for some form of authorization and control, if only to protect the service from script kiddies with too much time on their hands. Yet authentication has to be transparent for usability: we don't want to pop up login dialogs, particularly if the customer has already logged in to their eCommerce account.
Perhaps the biggest constraint on any security mechanism is that requests will come from a browser. This means that the service can't expect the requester to provide any secret information, because anybody can view the page or script (I'm amazed by just how many web services require a “secret key” in their URL). If a page needs to provide secret information, that information must be encrypted before it is delivered to the user.
And secret information is required, because there are different levels of authorization: some people can update a list, others can only read it. The solution that I chose is to encrypt the wishlist key and user's authorization level, and pass that to the service as a URL parameter. This does represent another departure from pure REST, in that there may be multiple URLs that refer to the same underlying resource, but it seems the most reasonable compromise.
It also has the limitation that anybody who has a URL has the access defined by that URL. In some web services, this would be a problem. In the case of the wishlist service, it's mitigated by several factors.
First among these is that the value of this data just isn't that high. Sure, if you plan to be nominated for the Supreme Court, you probably don't want to keep a wishlist of X-rated videos. But for most people, a wishlist of clothing just isn't that important (and an opt-in warning can scare away those who feel differently). A related factor is that, in normal usage, people won't be handing out these URLs — at least, not URLs that can make changes. There's simply no reason to do so.
A second mitigating factor is that each URL also has an encrypted timeout: the service will reject any requests that arrive after that timeout. While this can be used to exert control over shared lists, it is primarily intended to defeat script kiddies who might try a denial-of-service attack via constant updates.
A third mitigating factor is that we keep close control over secrets, particularly those that can be used to break the encryption — in other words, security through obscurity. Bletchely Park would not have been nearly so successful at breaking Enigma if they hadn't learned to recognize radio operators. Taking heed of that, none of the information used by the encrypted parameter is provided in plaintext, meaning that any attempts at discovering the key will require heuristic analysis rather than a simple